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Abstract
The contentious politics literature has long been divided on the 
extent to which grievances –or “dissatisfaction caused by depriva-
tion” (Dalton et al., 2009)– drive citizen participation in protests. 
Do grievances motivate citizens to take to the streets? To shed 
light on how grievances affect protest, we focus on citizen evalu-
ations of public service provision in Latin America. Scant research 
has examined the effect of poor public service delivery on con-
tentious participation in emerging democracies. We highlight two 
mechanisms associated with public service evaluations that facili-
tate mobilization: 1) firsthand experience with poor governance 
and 2) clear attribution of responsibility for poor service provi-
sion. To test our argument, we utilize data from the 2012 and 2014 
AmericasBarometer national surveys of Brazil, and then generalize 
to Latin America in multilevel models of protest drawing from 18 
countries. The results are consistent: where firsthand experience 
with state incompetence fuels declining system support and spe-
cific attribution of blame for underperformance, as in the case of 
public service evaluations in Latin America, grievances fuel par-
ticipation in protest.
Keywords: protest, public services, grievances, contentious poli-
tics, social movements
Introduction
As rates of protest participation have risen across the world 
(e.g., Dalton et al., 2009; Beaulieu, 2014; Moseley, 2018), 
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the contentious politics literature has grappled with the rel-
ative importance of grievances in mobilizing collective ac-
tors. On the one hand, many accounts of protest events em-
phasize the economic motivations of claimants –e.g., youth 
unemployment in the Arab Spring (Campante and Chor, 
2012) or state retrenchment in Latin America (Silva, 2009) 
during the neoliberal era. Yet, at the same time, empirical 
studies have found little evidence of grievance-motivated 
contention, highlighting instead the role of political oppor-
tunities and organizational resources as the key determi-
nants of successful mobilization (e.g., Dalton et al., 2009; 
Machado et al., 2011; Arce, 2014; Boulding, 2014). More-
over, several studies have even attributed swelling rates of 
contention to economic progress (e.g., Moseley, 2018; Mu-
rillo and Mangonnet, 2016), thus offering accounts that are 
diametrically opposed to grievance-based interpretations of 
protest.
Against the backdrop of these apparent contradictions 
in the existing literature, we ask the following questions: To 
what extent do grievances motivate citizens to take to the 
streets? Further, do evaluations of public service delivery, 
in particular, help explain the recent explosion of mass pro-
tests across Latin America? Relatively little research has ex-
amined the role of poor public service delivery in spurring 
contentious participation.3 In focusing on public service pro-
tests in Latin America, we highlight two characteristics of 
this particular grievance that we argue facilitate mobiliza-
tion: 1) firsthand experience with poor governance, which 
undermines faith in the political system, and 2) clear attri-
bution of responsibility for poor service provision, which 
supplies citizens with targets for protest. Throughout much 
of Latin America, economic progress under recent center-
left governments has resulted in expanded access to public 
services, yet in many cases their quality remains lackluster 
3 One partial exception would be work on the case of South Africa (e.g., De Juan 
and Wegner, 2017).
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(e.g., Levy and Schady, 2013). We argue that citizens con-
nect public service quality to elected officials’ performance 
and, through their firsthand experience with those services, 
are more motivated to seek redress than they would be if 
not due to that direct experience.
To test our argument, we utilize data from the 2012 and 
2014 AmericasBarometer surveys, conducted by the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (Lapop). The AmericasBa-
rometer surveys include not only a special battery of ques-
tions to gauge satisfaction with the quality of public health 
services, roads, and schools, but also contain an item on 
participation in recent protest demonstrations. We begin 
with a case study of Brazil, where protests erupting in 2013 
have inspired numerous grievance-based explanations. In 
the analysis of survey data from Brazil, we find support for 
our central expectation that public services evaluations are 
strongly related to protest participation. Then, we general-
ize our argument to 18 Latin American democracies. Finally, 
we offer a test of the mechanisms we argue connect public 
service grievances and protest –namely, the role firsthand 
experience with poor governance plays in fueling declining 
trust in the political system and increased attribution of re-
sponsibility for poor governance. The results are consistent: 
in the case of public service evaluations, where individu-
als can credibly assess blame for poor governance based on 
firsthand experience, grievances can fuel citizen participa-
tion in protest.
Grievances and Protest: The Existing Literature
As long as protest has existed, so too have scholars en-
deavored to understand why some individuals go to great 
lengths to give voice to their claims, while others choose 
to abstain. Yet the study of protest behavior became mod-
ernized and scientific following World War II (Wilkinson, 
2009). One of the most important modern breakthroughs 
in explaining protest behavior emerged in the 1960s and 
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stressed the importance of solving collective action prob-
lems. While previous scholarly work had mostly assumed 
that shared interest was enough to gather motivated ac-
tors together, Olson (1965) countered that individuals of-
ten have an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others 
because they can enjoy the benefits of coordinated action 
without contributing. In the absence of selective incentives, 
it is challenging to mobilize a group of individuals not just 
because of the costs of group formation, but the desire to 
free ride.
Eventually, two schools emerged that attempted to solve 
the collective action problem, forming a modern theoretical 
dichotomy in the protest literature:1) grievance-based the-
ories and 2) structural theories. The relationship between 
grievances, defined here as “dissatisfaction caused by de-
privation” (Dalton et al., 2009; 6) and protest was most fa-
mously advanced by Ted Gurr in his classic work Why Men 
Rebel (1970). Gurr argues that in contexts characterized by 
high levels of poverty and low standards of living, protest 
and other forms of contentious activity are more likely (Gurr, 
1970). Leaning on research from psychology, he claims that 
where the gap between citizens’ expectations and the real-
ity of their circumstances becomes too wide (i.e., “relative 
deprivation”), they lash out via more contentious modes of 
political behavior. 
For much of the 1970s, grievance-based approaches 
predominated (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). 
The logic makes intuitive sense: individuals living in con-
ditions that fail to meet their expectations should be more 
likely to engage in contentious behavior because they are 
frustrated with their current situation. Yet soon after the 
emergence of grievance-based arguments, a competing 
narrative emerged. Structural theories, in contrast to Gurr’s 
argument, note that protests require individuals to have 
the necessary organizational resources and political know-
how to mobilize contention, and these skills are often most 
highly developed in the affluent (Dalton et al., 2009). Re-
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source mobilization theory thus implies that in many cas-
es where grievances are present protests fail to materialize, 
and, on the other side of the coin, relatively minor griev-
ances can balloon into massive protest movements when 
harnessed by skilled “political entrepreneurs” (McCarthy 
and Zald, 1977). According to this perspective, the pres-
ence of educated citizens and motivated elites who are 
sympathetic to a specific cause is more important for the 
success of a movement than poor living conditions. To sup-
port this claim, McAdam (1982) famously noted that Afri-
can-American protests during the Civil Rights Movement 
only started to gain momentum after sympathetic Northern 
elites and black activists, fueled by an emerging African-
American middle class and the growth of historically black 
universities, joined forces in the 1960s. In their cross-na-
tional study of the determinants of protest using data from 
the World Values Survey, Dalton et al. (2009) conclude, 
“without the resources and skills to become politically en-
gaged… grievances are typically not translated into politi-
cal action” (22).
The shift from grievance-based arguments to those fo-
cused on resources is also reflected in the literature on Latin 
America. While in the past scholars have argued that pov-
erty and joblessness, particularly following the implemen-
tation of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s (Walton and Ra-
gan, 1990; Silva, 2009), were a driving force in mobilizing 
protestors, much has changed in the region. In the past de-
cade, Latin America has witnessed a rise in living standards 
with an increasing number of individuals joining the mid-
dle class. Moreover, in the 2000s many Latin American na-
tions elected leftist and center-left politicians to the pres-
idency in a wave known as the “pink tide” (Graham and 
Smith, 2012). Promising to direct more funding towards 
public goods provision, these leaders increasingly invest-
ed in programs such as health care and education, incorpo-
rating previous political “outsiders” in unprecedented ways 
(Garay, 2016). Yet, even in this era of relative economic 
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prosperity and democratic stability, protest rates have actu-
ally risen across the region (Mangonnet and Murillo, 2016; 
Moseley, 2018), presenting an important challenge to griev-
ance-based theory. 
At the same time, anecdotal evidence suggests it might 
be time to revisit the grievance thesis in Latin America. Re-
cent upheaval in Brazil has widely been attributed to ram-
pant corruption, high crime rates, and a sagging economy. 
The same goes for Venezuela, where a severe economic re-
cession, triggered in the eyes of many by irresponsible fis-
cal policies and declining oil prices, has coincided with un-
precedented rates of street-based participation. In Chile, 
a country characterized by relatively low rates of conten-
tion since democratization, student-led protests for educa-
tional reform have grabbed headlines since 2011. In short, 
journalistic accounts of recent protests across Latin Amer-
ica suggest some role for grievances –however, the ques-
tion remains of just how much grievances matter, and un-
der what conditions they propel citizens to the streets. 
How Public Service Evaluations Fuel  
Protest Participation
Despite an extensive literature documenting the relatively 
weak relationship between grievances and collective ac-
tion, we argue that perceptions of public service quality mo-
tivate protestors. This is based on two primary mechanisms: 
1) poor public service provision offers citizens firsthand ex-
perience with poor governance, which erodes support for 
the political system, and 2) provides them with ammunition 
to blame high profile policymakers for substandard service 
quality. We address each step of this process in turn.
Declining System Support through Firsthand Experience 
with Poor Governance
Scholars in political science and sociology have long puz-
zled over the correlation between personal experience with 
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grievances and protest participation. Most theoretical work 
has revolved around individuals’ ability to connect their 
own personal circumstances to larger societal problems. 
Studies have found that where individuals have person-
al experience with motivating claims, they are more moti-
vated to take to the streets, so long as they connect those 
personal experiences to larger group concerns (e.g., Cros-
by, 1976) –a scenario that Foster and Matheson (1999) dub 
“double relative deprivation,” in that it affects both person-
al and group interests. For certain grievances, like discrimi-
nation, the linkage between personal experience and wid-
er systemic injustices is not always apparent (Crosby et al., 
1986). However, in the case of public service grievances, 
firsthand experience with poor governance provides clear 
evidence that highlights the state’s general inability to sat-
isfy its basic obligations to citizens. 
Where personal grievances are clearly connected to 
poor governance, they can affect larger perceptions of the 
political system, and drive participation in politics. For ex-
ample, Seligson (2006) argues and finds that experience 
with corruption has a stronger impact on regime legitimacy 
than perceptions of corruption. In her article on crime vic-
timization and political participation, Bateson (2012) finds a 
nearly universal positive effect for experience with crime on 
the likelihood that individuals take part in elections, local 
community activities, and protest –in many cases, victims 
“seek assistance from elected officials or lobby for policy 
changes that are narrowly related to the crimes they have 
suffered” (571). Gingerich (2009) finds that experience with 
corruption pushes individuals to protest, implying a proac-
tive response fueled by firsthand knowledge of public offi-
cials’ involvement in political graft. Finally, in their study of 
South Africa, De Juan and Wegner (2017) uncover evidence 
that perceptions of public service quality are tightly corre-
lated with general trust in government, and thus fuel pro-
test. Given the tight correlation between support for the po-
litical system and protest participation (Moseley, 2018), we 
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view the potential role that public service grievances play 
in diminishing such support as critical to understanding the 
connection between public service evaluations and protest 
behavior.
We argue that firsthand knowledge of poor gover-
nance can erode faith in core political institutions, and al-
so provide the psychological jolt necessary to spur con-
tention. That is, where mere perceptions of government 
performance can seem distant, actually suffering the con-
sequences of such inadequacies carries a stronger impact 
on the likelihood that aggrieved individuals will take ac-
tion against the government. In some ways, this argument 
seems at odds with findings from the economic voting liter-
ature, which has generally uncovered a powerful associa-
tion between vote choice and sociotropic evaluations of the 
country’s economy than pocketbook considerations (e. g., 
Markus, 1988) –in other words, a stronger effect for percep-
tions than firsthand experience. The difference, in our view, 
is that overcoming the significant costs associated with 
protesting requires extra motivation on the part of citizens, 
making it a fundamentally distinct act from voting. Where 
individuals have firsthand knowledge of the state’s incom-
petence in providing quality healthcare services, schools, 
and roads, we argue they will be more positively inclined 
to take direct action against the government, overcoming 
traditional barriers to protest.
In the case of public service provision, a child’s bad ex-
perience with resources at a local school or treatment at 
the public health clinic should thus carry more weight for a 
parent’s decision to protest than reading about such inad-
equacies in the paper. The more tangible the grievance, the 
more likely we argue it produces a meaningful behavioral 
response. Yet as others have noted (Foster and Matheson, 
1995; Walker and Mann, 1987), not all personal grievances 
translate into political action –in our view, that direct con-
nection only heightens the probability that individuals will 
take action. One of the principal contributions of this study, 
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then, is to highlight the role that firsthand knowledge of 
poor service quality can have in diminishing support for the 
political system at large, and fueling potential anti-govern-
ment action. 
Figure 1.  
Predicted Effects of Public Service Evaluations  
on System Support
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In terms of observable implications, we should therefore 
find that public service evaluations are positively associat-
ed with support for the political system. This expectation is 
borne out in Figure 1.4 Building on previous research (Mose-
ley, 2018), we know that low levels of support for the politi-
cal system are associated with an increased willingness to 
confront public officials for their ineffectiveness. Therefore, 
the declines in system support associated with negative 
evaluations of public service quality serve as a key mecha-
4 Figures 1 and 2 are graphs of linear predictions from estimated OLS regres-
sion models of system support and approval of anti-government protests on 
public service evaluations. “System support” comes from Booth and Seligson’s 
(2009) measure of support for key regime institutions. See Appendix for ques-
tion wording.
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nism in explaining the relationship between public service 
grievances and protest. In our view, not all grievances are 
experienced in tangible ways by a broad enough swath of 
citizens to motivate protest. For example, mere perceptions 
of insecurity or poor economic conditions –widely consid-
ered to have motivated recent mobilization in Brazil (Simões, 
2013)–without direct experience with those grievances 
might not create a strong enough trigger to actually incite 
action against the government. Our intention in this paper, 
then, is not only to demonstrate that public service evalua-
tions are correlated with protest participation, but that one 
key mechanism by which this relationship exists lies in the 
effect of experience with poor governance on support for 
the political system.
The Downside of Credit-Claiming:  
Blaming Politicians for Poor Public Services
There is bountiful evidence that firsthand experience with 
poor governance can provide the additional motivation in-
dividuals need to translate grievances into action. Yet that 
increased “protest potential” requires a target for collective 
action. In the case of public service grievances, we argue 
the chain of responsibility is readily apparent to aggrieved 
citizens.
To this point, much of the literature on blame attribution 
has focused on performance voting, proposing conditions 
under which voters will punish politicians for poor economic 
performance, in particular. A number of studies have brought 
empirical evidence to bear on the question of blame attribu-
tion in different institutional contexts. Powell and Whitton 
(1993) were the first to argue that economic voting is con-
tingent on the degree to which “clarity of responsibility” for 
past economic performance is readily accessible to voters. 
Anderson (1995) finds that economic voting is suppressed 
in countries led by coalition governments, as citizens find 
it more difficult to assign responsibility for economic under-
performance to one specific party. In their comprehensive 
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treatment of the relationship between institutional settings 
and economic voting, Duch and Stevenson (2008) discov-
er that where there is a high degree of state control over 
economic policy, voters are more likely to punish incum-
bents for perceived mismanagement (see also Carlin and 
Singh, 2015). Likewise, scholars have found that in federal 
systems, voters face a more difficult task in terms of blame 
attribution, balancing the relative culpability of provincial 
and national-level politicians (Atkeson and Partin, 1995).
Yet in the contentious politics literature, clarity of re-
sponsibility had not been thoroughly examined until Jave-
line’s (2003) study of protest behavior in Russia in the 
late1990s. By this point, grievance-based arguments had 
lost much of their cachet, and were often considered sec-
ondary to structural arguments. For Javeline, specificity in 
terms of blame attribution “reduces the costs of informa-
tion, organization, and opportunity” (109), and thus makes 
the mobilization of contention more feasible. In her analysis 
of the wage arrears crisis in Russia, individuals who were 
able to make specific attributions of blame were five times 
more likely to protest than those who offered nebulous cri-
tiques. Further, she finds that political entrepreneurs can 
most efficiently mobilize individuals who offer non-specific 
critiques of public figures, given the already-high likelihood 
that citizens who offer specific attribution of blame will pro-
test. Thus, “some grievances may compel the use of more 
resources than others to inform or convince members about 
blame successfully” (Javeline, 2003; 119).
There is some reason to believe that grievances have 
played a role in the normalization of protest in the region 
(Moseley, 2018), in part fueled by increasing clarity of re-
sponsibility. While in the recent past scholars have argued 
that poverty and joblessness, particularly following the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s (Silva, 
2009), were a driving force in mobilizing protestors, much 
has changed in the region. Latin America has witnessed re-
cently a rise in living standards with increasing numbers 
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of individuals leaving lower socioeconomic brackets and 
joining the middle class, which has been fueled in part by 
an extension of the welfare state (Garay, 2016). One of the 
most important innovations has been the conditional cash 
transfer program, which presidents across the region have 
utilized not only to alleviate extreme poverty, but to boost 
their support at election time (Layton et al., 2017). 
Indeed, many Latin American politicians have attempt-
ed to bolster public service provision in an explicit effort 
to woo voters. During the 1990s, Brazilian President Fer-
nando Henrique Cardoso launched a new program, Cartão 
Cidadão, designed to facilitate transferring social welfare 
benefits. This card was introduced months before an elec-
tion, and represented an attempt to claim credit for trans-
fers (Garay, 2016). His successor, Lula da Silva, launched 
the famous Bolsa Familia program in 2004, and reaped the 
electoral rewards when he was reelected in 2006. In Ar-
gentina, Néstor Kirchner launched policies negotiated with 
social movement leaders in direct response to their de-
mands for improved pensions and health care services (Ga-
ray, 2007). The Argentine government also enacted univer-
sal child allowances during a time in which poverty rates 
happened to be lower than in previous years, with at least 
the partial objective of taking credit for benefits that would 
placate social movements and stop protests (Garay, 2016). 
In all of these cases, politicians endeavored to highlight 
their role in providing citizens with new and/or improved 
public services. 
In direct contrast to Gurr’s argument regarding pover-
ty and contentious behavior, the significant gains made by 
large swaths of the population have not mitigated, but rath-
er coincided with an increase in the number of those who 
have opted to take to the streets in places such as Argen-
tina, Brazil, and Chile (Moseley, 2018; Mangonnet and Mu-
rillo, 2016). In our view, this can be traced in part to the 
extension of the Latin American safety net, which in turn 
made more salient the connection between politicians (es-
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pecially presidents) and public services. When many ser-
vices were provided by the private sector, or presidents ne-
glected to draw the connection between policy inputs and 
outputs, citizens found it more difficult to apportion blame 
for perceived underperformance. But now, those connec-
tions have been made clearer. 
Figure 2.  
Predicted Effects of Public Service Evaluations  
on Presidential Approval
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If public service grievances highlight issues related to poor 
governance, and citizens blame prominent politicians for 
said underperformance, then this could be a second path-
way through which public service evaluations affect pro-
test participation. Indeed, there appears to be a strong cor-
relation between perceptions of public service quality and 
presidential approval (Figure 2), lending some credence 
to the notion that citizens blame prominent politicians for 
perceived state incompetence. The implication here is that 
grievances associated with a clear chain of responsibility 
–e.g., the quality of public services or corruption (see Ta-
vits, 2007)– should be characterized by stronger predictive 
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power in explaining protest participation than grievances 
that are less easily traced to their origins –e.g., pocketbook 
economic evaluations (see Kinder and Kiewet, 1981; also, 
Gomez and Wilson, 2001). We should also expect that the 
former class of grievances should be more strongly corre-
lated with evaluations of politicians than the latter group.5 
The extent to which public service grievances reflect poor-
ly on elected officials, then, would seem to be an important 
mechanism by which evaluations of service quality trans-
lated into higher rates of protest participation.
A Grievance-Based Theory of Public Service Protests
Since Gurr (1970), much of the theory-building within the 
protest literature has shifted away from grievance-based 
arguments, focusing instead on access to organizational 
tools. There is no doubt that resources such as education, 
income, and social capital matter a great deal in determin-
ing who engages in protest. However, the shift away from 
grievance-based arguments has potentially obfuscated the 
importance of key variables. We argue that certain griev-
ances have actually played an important role in mobilizing 
Latin American demonstrators in the 2010s. Specifically, the 
connection between the state’s inability to provide satis-
factory public services, such as health care, transportation, 
and education, and contentious behavior among citizens, is 
one that we seek to explore further here. 
We argue that in the case of public service evaluations, 
the conditions are ripe for translating grievances into ac-
tion. Evaluations of public services are particularly apt moti-
vators of protest due to the combination of direct experience 
with poor governance, and the increasingly clear connec-
5 This probably depends on other factors, including the salience of the issue at that 
moment in time (Epstein and Segal, 2000), or individuals’ awareness about pol-
itics (Zaller, 1992; Gomez and Wilson, 2001). In the case of grievances related to 
public service provision, we would thus expect such evaluations to be strongly 
correlated with presidential approval, and even more so among the politically 
interested during times of heightened grievance salience. 
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tion between politicians and service quality. The vast ma-
jority of Latin Americans believe that the state should take 
an active role in the educational and health sectors to re-
duce inequality (Lapop, 2012-2014), which places most Lat-
in American countries far above countries like the U.S. and 
even Canada in terms of preferences for state intervention. 
With an increasing number of Latin American countries of-
fering near-universal health coverage (World Bank, 2013) 
and access to public education (World Bank, 2017), not to 
mention citizens’ automatic interaction with roads and 
other aspects of state infrastructure, the majority of Latin 
Americans have direct experience with these shortcomings 
in terms of public service delivery.
While Latin Americans have borne witness to increased 
access to public services like healthcare and education, 
the quality of those services has often lagged behind ex-
pectations. Due in part to a lack of tax revenue vis-à-vis 
OECD countries (Zovatto, 2015; Melguizo, 2017), Latin Amer-
ican countries often struggle to adequately fund education, 
healthcare, and infrastructure. As of 2011, millions of Latin 
American children were still not enrolled in school, and a 
preponderance of primary and secondary public schools are 
chronically underfunded (Unesco, 2013). Over half of citi-
zens in most Latin American countries offer negative eval-
uations of the services available in their countries (Lapop, 
2012-2014). Bribery at the point of delivery has also prov-
en to be an intractable problem in many Latin American 
countries, with as many as one-third of those who accessed 
public services reporting paying a bribe to do so (Lapop, 
2012-2014; Transparency International, 2017). Given the 
importance of public services in reducing inequality and 
fighting poverty, the current shortcomings of the public sec-
tor in Latin America could undermine future social and eco-
nomic progress (Oxfam, 2017). Further, local observers have 
pointed to poor public service provision as a key motivator 
in recent episodes of contention from transportation in Bra-
zil (Alves, 2013) to education in Chile (Long, 2011).
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The general expectation, then, is that when individ-
uals believe the state offers high quality public services, 
they should be less likely to engage in contentious behav-
ior on average. When a government is perceived as inef-
fective in its duties, contentious behavior is more likely to 
occur. On the issue of public service delivery, citizens can 
apportion blame and have firsthand knowledge of state in-
competence. Particularly within the context of Latin Ameri-
ca, politicians have endeavored to connect their fate to ex-
panded state services. Further, virtually all Latin American 
citizens have direct experience with some facet of public 
service provision, unlike perceptions of crime, corruption, 
or national economic performance, with which many citi-
zens have not interacted firsthand. We argue this firsthand 
knowledge can erode support for political system, and pro-
vide citizens with targets for their frustration.
One key implication of our argument, then, is that public 
service evaluations should not be the only grievances asso-
ciated with protest participation. Experience with corrup-
tion, for example, would seem to combine a relatively di-
rect chain of responsibility with firsthand experience with 
poor governance (see Gingerich, 2009). The same could be 
true of crime victimization. Yet many of the individual and 
country level measures used to capture grievances in pre-
vious studies, like sociotropic and personal economic con-
siderations or GDP growth (see Dalton et al., 2009), seem to 
require a more difficult calculus on the part of prospective 
protestors to attribute blame, or might be too distant to de-
press support for key regime institutions, and thus motivate 
participation. Our expectation is that public service evalua-
tions will be more powerfully associated with protest par-
ticipation due to the reasons outlined above.
To our knowledge, no study has yet explored how pub-
lic service evaluations are associated with protest partici-
pation in Latin America, or across countries. However, a re-
cent article on South Africa finds a positive and significant 
relationship between access to basic public services (e.g., 
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water, electricity, and plumbing) and the incidence of vio-
lent and non-violent protests (De Juan and Wegner, 2017). 
The authors identify the phenomenon connecting the two 
as “horizontal inequality,” a form of relative deprivation in 
which individuals compare public service inadequacies in 
their own neighborhoods with more effective delivery in 
neighboring areas. In the case of public services like health, 
education, and transit infrastructure, it is unclear that rela-
tive deprivation would be the mechanism at work. Evalua-
tions of these public services are unrelated to social class, 
leading us to believe that the role poor perceived delivery 
plays in mobilizing protestors has more to do with the sig-
nals it sends to citizens regarding state incompetence and 
responsibility than its effect on aggrieved individuals’ ob-
jective well-being vis-à-vis other citizens. In our view, 
negative public service evaluations represent a grievance 
that lowers barriers to participate in protests –we intend to 
provide an empirical test of that perspective in the follow-
ing section.
Data and Measurement
To test our argument, we utilize data from the 2012 and 
2014 AmericasBarometer national surveys of Brazil, and 
then generalize those results to AmericasBarometer data 
from 18 Latin American countries. The AmericasBarome-
ter surveys are conducted biennially by the Latin American 
Public Opinion Project (Lapop), housed at Vanderbilt Uni-
versity. Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer has measured 
democratic attitudes and behaviors using national probabil-
ity samples of voting-age adults in countries throughout the 
Western Hemisphere.6
We choose the Brazilian case for a number of rea-
sons. First, recent protests in Brazil have inspired numer-
6 For more information on the Lapop, its sources of funding, and the sampling 
methodology and question wording employed, please visit www.vanderbilt.
edu/lapop/. See Appendix for descriptive statistics. 
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ous grievance-based explanations, ranging from corruption 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2017) to economic recession (Carvalho, 
2017) to poor public service provision (Watts, 2013). Bra-
zil thus offers an excellent test case to adjudicate be-
tween rival grievance-based explanations. Second, Brazil 
went from being a relatively low protest country in 2012 
to a highly contentious case in 2014 (Moseley and Layton, 
2014). Drawing on two national surveys carried out in two 
very distinct contexts thus helps us generalize to other Latin 
American countries. Finally, as the region’s largest democ-
racy and economy, and currently at a crossroads follow-
ing Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment and the rise of far-right 
presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro, we argue the Brazil-
ian case is particularly vital to understanding the conten-
tious consequences of grievances in Latin America.  
Our dependent variable is whether or not individu-
als report participating in a street march or demonstra-
tion during the prior 12 months. This provides a relatively 
straightforward measure of the common street-based ac-
tivism that has been on the rise in Latin America in recent 
years (Moseley, 2018). Our key independent variable is an 
index drawn from three specific survey items. In 2012, the 
AmericasBarometer began to include three specific ques-
tions aimed to gauge citizen evaluations of the quality of 
public services in their community. These included ques-
tions about the quality of roads, the quality of public edu-
cation, and the quality of public health services. We com-
bine responses to these three questions in a single index 
we call the Public Services Index, but also run a regional 
model that includes each variable separately that we in-
clude in the Appendix Table A4. 
In addition to measuring perceptions of public servic-
es, we include several variables to estimate the effects of 
a variety of potential protest-motivating grievances. These 
include corruption and crime victimization, perceptions of 
the government’s effort to combat corruption, perception 
of crime in one’s neighborhood, and sociotropic and pock-
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etbook economic evaluations (all are scaled 0-100). In the 
regional analysis, in which we utilize multilevel modeling 
techniques, we also include second level economic vari-
ables like inequality (GINI), economic growth, and unem-
ployment, given the potential relevance of these trends in 
motivating protest behavior. Each logistic regression model 
also includes controls for skin color, sex, age, wealth, level 
of education, civic activism, and the size of city where the 
individual lives. Altogether, these variables form a compre-
hensive list of reasons why individuals might take to the 
streets.  
In the second section of the analysis, we also report 
results from a Sobel-Goodman mediation test, which is 
designed to offer evidence for the mechanisms we ar-
gue connect public service grievances and protest partici-
pation. We use the AmericasBarometer measure for sys-
tem support, which we believe will capture the extent to 
which experience with poor governance causes citizens 
to lose faith in key regime institutions, including trust in 
congress, the courts, and pride in the system (Booth and 
Seligson, 2009; see Appendix). To measure whether pub-
lic service grievances translate into more negative evalu-
ations of incumbent politicians, as predicted by our theo-
ry, we use a simple measure of presidential approval. Our 
expectation is that while the relationship between pub-
lic service evaluations and protest is significant, part of 
that effect flows through the two mechanisms we describe 
above.
We therefore adopt a two-stage approach to testing our 
hypotheses. First, we evaluate which grievances are most 
strongly associated with protest in the Brazilian case, uti-
lizing logistic regression analysis of complex survey data. 
We then provide a general sense of the relationship be-
tween public service evaluations and protest participation 
across Latin America, estimating regional models of pro-
test which include fixed effects for country and survey year, 
and second level variables for inequality (GINI), economic 
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growth, and unemployment.7 Then, we test for the mech-
anisms we argue make public service grievances a potent 
source of protest activity –declining support for the political 
system and more negative evaluations of incumbent presi-
dents. These complementary approaches allow us to both 
offer a generalizable account of the relationship between 
public service grievances and protest, while also increasing 
internal validity by focusing on a country where we have a 
clear understanding of the nature of contention at that mo-
ment and highlighting the mechanisms through which ser-
vice evaluations and protest are related. 
Results
In Table 1, we present results of two estimated logistic re-
gression models of protest participation in Brazil, pooling 
data from the 2012 and 2014 country surveys while includ-
ing a dummy for survey year. Model 1 includes only con-
trol variables, whereas Model 2 includes a set of relevant 
grievances. Both models reveal a significant negative rela-
tionship between public service evaluations and reported 
protest participation. In Model 2, only two grievances are 
significantly related to protest –public service evaluations 
and crime victimization. All other grievances are uncorre-
lated with protest participation, though corruption victim-
ization nears statistical significance (p<.12). Further, it ap-
pears that wealth actually has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on protest participation, along with com-
munity activism and education. These results thus produce 
little evidence for a theory of relative deprivation, given 
that protestors seem to come from more privileged back-
grounds in the case of Brazil. 
7 We supplement standard logistic regression models of participation with an 
instrumental variables approach, which helps account for issues related to en-
dogeneity, and present those findings in the Appendix Table A2.
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Table 1.  
Estimated Logistic Regression Models of Protest in Brazil
DV: Protest Participation (0 or 1)
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Perception of Public Service Quality -0.012*** -0.009**
(0.004) (0.005)
Skin Color -0.009 -0.008
(0.038) (0.039)
Female -0.192 -0.130
(0.160) (0.164)
Age -0.031*** -0.031***
(0.007) (0.007)
Wealth Quintile 0.132** 0.127*
(0.065) (0.066)
Education 0.131*** 0.128***
(0.026) (0.027)
Community Activism 0.018*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.004)
Urban -0.491 -0.433
(0.360) (0.365)
Size of Place -0.045 -0.015
(0.082) (0.085)
Corruption Victim 0.003
(0.002)
Crime Victim 0.005***
(0.002)
Perception of Crime 0.000
(0.003)
Perception of Efforts to Combat Corruption -0.001
(0.003)
Sociotropic Economic Evaluation -0.000
(0.002)
Pocketbook Economic Evaluation 0.001
(0.002)
2014 0.574*** 0.605***
(0.165) (0.177)
Constant -2.696*** -3.206***
(0.653) (0.703)
Observations 2,974 2,853
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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On substantive effects, again it appears that public ser-
vice evaluations outpace other grievances in terms of pro-
test potential –a decrease from the most positive opinion of 
public service quality to the lowest evaluation more than 
doubles the likelihood that individuals have participated in 
a street march or demonstration during the previous year 
(Figure 3). These effects fail to achieve the substantive im-
portance of education or community participation, which 
can increase the odds of participation by as much as 500 
percent, and thus offer support for the resource mobiliza-
tion framework. Still, the observed effects for public service 
evaluations register as consequential in terms of under-
standing recent protests in Brazil. 
Figure 3.  
Predicted Probabilities of Protest Participation in Brazil  
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Put simply, a less focused investigation of how grievanc-
es are correlated with protest in Brazil might lead to the 
conclusion that they do not particularly matter in under-
standing contentious behavior. Sociotropic and pocketbook 
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evaluations fail to exert significant effects on the probabil-
ity that individuals protest, nor do protestors seem to come 
from marginalized populations. However, when individuals 
have firsthand experience with state incompetence and can 
reasonably attribute blame –as we argue is the case with 
public service evaluations– it is clear that grievances are 
correlated with mobilization. 
Table 2 reports results from two logistic regression models 
of protest participation across 18 countries in Latin Ameri-
ca. Model 3 includes only control variables at the individual 
and country levels, while Model 4 includes the full battery 
of grievances from Model 2, along with second-level eco-
nomic variables that could reveal evidence of protest spik-
ing during hard economic times. Results from both models 
lend strong support to the notion that public service evalua-
tions are associated with the decision to protest.
Table 2.  
Estimated Logistic Regression Models of Protest  
in Latin America
DV: Protest Participation (0 or 1)
Variables Model 3 Model 4
Perception of Public Service Quality -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Skin Color 0.036*** 0.035***
(0.010) (0.010)
Female -0.344*** -0.288***
(0.032) (0.034)
Age -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Wealth Quintile 0.024* 0.014
(0.013) (0.013)
Education 0.055*** 0.050***
(0.004) (0.005)
Community Activism 0.016*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001)
Urban -0.003 0.033
(0.060) (0.062)
Size of Place -0.062*** -0.034*
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(0.017) (0.018)
Corruption Victim 0.005***
(0.000)
Crime Victim 0.005***
(0.000)
Perception of Crime -0.000
(0.001)
Perception of Efforts to Combat  
Corruption 0.000
(0.001)
Sociotropic Economic Evaluation 0.000
(0.001)
Pocketbook Economic Evaluation -0.001
(0.001)
2014 -0.033 -0.033
(0.077) (0.074)
GINI 3.638 4.194
(7.841) (7.590)
GDP Growth -0.044* -0.044**
(0.023) (0.022)
Unemployment -0.099 -0.103
(0.100) (0.097)
Constant -4.147 -5.014
(3.871) (3.746)
Observations 56,354 53,364
Number of Country Years 36 36
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
According to the results of the two models, public service 
evaluations have a significant negative impact on the likeli-
hood that individuals take part in protests. In other words, 
an increase in the perceived quality of roads, schools, and 
public health services decreases the probability that one 
will take to the streets. Other grievances are also significant 
predictors of protest –namely, corruption and crime victim-
ization. On the other hand, perceptions of crime, corruption, 
and the current economic situation (either personal or so-
ciotropic) fail to achieve statistical significance. 
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Figure 3 plots standardized coefficients to better com-
pare the relative import of each variable in Model 4. Clear-
ly, having direct experience with crime or corruption is sig-
nificantly associated with protest participation, in keeping 
with findings from Gingerich (2009). Among all of the vari-
ables in the model, public service evaluations seem to have 
one of the strongest negative effects on protest behavior. 
To put this in perspective, moving from the most negative 
to most positive evaluations of public services decreases 
the probability of protesting by nearly 70 percent. Finally, 
it should be noted that education and community activism 
continue to exert the strongest effects on protest participa-
tion, in keeping with the resource mobilization approach to 
understanding contention and recent findings from the pro-
test literature (Figure 3). 
Figure 4.  
Predictors of Protest Participation in Latin America 
(Standardized coefficients)
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We fail to uncover much support for the notion that coun-
try-level grievances exert significant influence on individ-
ual level protest behavior, yet we must caution that this 
analysis draws on only 18 country cases over two rounds of 
the AmericasBarometer. There is some initial evidence that 
economic downturns have a slight impact on the likelihood 
that individuals will protest (a 5% decrease in growth rate 
results in a .02 shift in the probability of protesting), yet we 
find little effect for either inequality or unemployment. A 
country-level analysis of the effect of economic factors on 
rates of activism would therefore find little evidence for 
grievance-based protest in Latin America. Yet we find com-
pelling evidence that grievances can correlate with protest 
participation, as is the case with perceptions of public ser-
vice quality. In the following section, we seek to shed light 
on the mechanisms by which public service grievances 
translate into protest participation.
Testing for Causal Mechanisms using Sobel-Goodman  
Mediation Tests
Our argument rests on the notion that public service griev-
ances activate protestors through firsthand experience with 
poor governance, which makes citizens more critical of the 
political system, and supplies them with targets for claim 
making. In this section, we carry out a Sobel-Goodman me-
diation test to evaluate the extent to which 1) system sup-
port and 2) presidential approval serve as mediators in the 
relationship between public service grievances and protest 
participation.
The Sobel-Goodman approach tests whether a mediator 
carries at least part of the effect of an independent variable 
on the dependent variable of interest (Sobel, 1982). It con-
stitutes an effective way of testing for the presence of an 
important causal mechanism –in this case, we aim to ascer-
tain if the effect of public service evaluations flows to the 
probability of protesting through declining system support, 
and more negative evaluations of incumbent politicians. 
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Our argument is that firsthand experience with poor gov-
ernance via substandard public service delivery decreases 
support for key regime institutions and elevates blame di-
rected at incumbent politicians (in this case, the president).8 
While we have already reported graphs indicating the 
strong relationship between public service evaluations and 
both system support and presidential approval, this statisti-
cal approach represents a more direct test of the notion that 
these two variables serve as important mechanisms con-
necting public service grievances and protest participation.
Table 3.  
Results of Sobel-Goodman Mediation Tests
Brazil Latin America
System 
Support
Presidential  
Approval
System 
Support
Presidential 
Approval
Sobel-Goodman 
Test Coeff.
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.009**
(0.005)
-0.009***
(0.001)
-0.009***
(0.002)
Proportion of Total 
Effect Mediated 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.16
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3 reports results from the Sobel-Goodman mediation 
tests, which control for the same battery of individual le-
vel variables included in the models presented in Tables 1 
and 2. They indicate that, except in the case of system sup-
port in Brazil, our expectations are borne out –individuals’ 
firsthand experience with poor governance translates into 
an increased likelihood of protesting through declining sys-
tem support (in Latin America) and more negative evalua-
tions of the incumbent president (Brazil and Latin America). 
Significant results indicate an important reduction in the 
8 We lack a measure across Latin American countries that asks respondents to 
rate any other single elected official other than the president, but given what 
we know about recent credit-claiming for service improvement by presidents, 
it seems like the most appropriate test of our argument.
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effect of public service evaluations on protest when the me-
diator is included in the model –in other words, in the mo-
dels of protest in Latin America, more than 0.30 of the to-
tal effect exerted by perceptions of public service quality on 
the likelihood of protest is the result of their impact on sys-
tem support and presidential approval, which in turn makes 
individuals more likely to protest. The absence of a medita-
tion effect for system support in Brazil indicates that public 
service evaluations affect protest through other pathways, 
and runs counter to results from South Africa (De Juan and 
Wegner, 2017). 
Overall, the results provide support for the two mecha-
nisms we identify in our argument as connectors between 
public service grievances and protest participation. While 
public service evaluations clearly exert an independent ef-
fect on the likelihood that individuals protest, they also de-
press system support and presidential approval, which in 
turn are positively associated with the probability of pro-
testing. Public service evaluations thus represent a griev-
ance that enables citizens to connect their own personal 
experiences with poor governance, and then provides indi-
viduals with a target for their discontent. When grievances 
are characterized by these important protest-producing fac-
tors, they can indeed matter in understanding recent pro-
test participation in Latin America. 
Conclusion
The increasing salience of protest in many parts of Lat-
in America in the 2010s calls for scholarly attention to the 
sources and consequences of popular contention. While 
previous work has demonstrated the importance of indi-
vidual-level variables like community activism and educa-
tion as predictors of protest, this paper has sought to shed 
light on the importance of grievances –in particular, dis-
satisfaction with the quality of public services–in mobiliz-
ing citizens. We find that while the organizational resources 
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stressed in the extant literature very clearly matter for un-
derstanding protest participation, grievances too can push 
citizens to the streets under certain conditions. 
The importance of public service evaluations as a pre-
dictor of protest in Latin America is indicative of a number 
of phenomena, chief of which is the importance of individ-
uals increasingly making connections between their own 
living conditions and government performance. Where citi-
zens perceive blame for poor public services and have di-
rect knowledge of poor governance, they are more prone 
to seeking redress through contentious modes of behavior. 
Latin Americans are widely supportive of democratic gover-
nance and a more interventionist state, and where the state 
fails to deliver on those expectations, citizens across the re-
gion have shown a willingness to hold public officials ac-
countable through non-institutional methods.
Recent work has indicated that the surge in protest 
participation across Latin America is not a sign of creep-
ing extremism, but rather a conventional response to poor 
government performance amid high levels of citizen en-
gagement in politics (Moseley, 2018). The findings pre-
sented here complement that perspective, as we shed light 
on one particularly important sphere in which Latin Amer-
ican regime performance leaves much to be desired, and 
has thus played an important part in sparking contentious 
participation. While not all grievances translate into action, 
claims regarding public service provision satisfy the key 
criteria that seem to make protest more likely. In this new 
era of democratic governance and citizen engagement in 
politics in Latin America, policymakers can no longer expect 
citizen complacency with respect to poor governance.
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Appendix
Table A1.  
Question Wording and Descriptive Statistics  
(Regional Statistics)
Variable Question Wording or Explanation N Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Dependent Variables
Protest  
Participation
“In the last 12 months, have you par-
ticipated in a demonstration or protest 
march?”
0-No, 100-Yes
57,829 8.06 27.22 0 100
Independent Variables
Public  
Service  
Evaluations
A weighted index of three questions 
asking respondents about the quality 
of roads, schools, and health services.
0-Lowest, 100-Highest.
58,102 51.02 19.10 0 100
System  
Support
A weighted index of five questions 
that measure support for the existing 
system. The five ask respondents “To 
what extent do you think the courts 
of justice guarantee a fair trial?,” “To 
what extent do you respect the politi-
cal institutions of (country)?,” “To what 
extent do you think that citizens’ basic 
rights are well protected by the politi-
cal system of (country)?,” “To what ex-
tent do you feel proud of living under 
the political system of (country)?,” and 
“To what extent do you think that one 
should support the political system of 
(country)?”
0-Lowest, 100-Highest
57,166 51.80 23.56 0 100
Presidential 
Approval
“Speaking in general of the cur-
rent administration, how would you 
rate the job performance of President 
NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT?”
0-Lowest, 100-Highest.
57,413 56.81 24.37 0 100
Satisfaction 
with Health 
Services
“And thinking about this city/area 
where you live, are you very satis-
fied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dis-
satisfied with the condition of public 
health services?”
Originally 1-Very Satisfied, 4-Very 
Dissatisfied. Very Satisfied Convert-
ed to 100 point index, 0-Lowest, 100 
Highest.
55,870 47.99 25.62 0 100
Corruption 
Victim
Dummy variable asking individuals if 
they were victims of corruption.
0-No, 100-Yes.
58,174 20.51 40.38 0 100
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Crime Victim
“Has any other person living in your 
household been a victim of any type 
of crime in the past 12 months? That 
is, has any other person living in your 
household been a victim of robbery, 
burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, ex-
tortion, violent threats or any other 
type of crime in the past 12 months?”
0-No, 100-Yes.
58,088 32.17 46.71 0 100
Perception of 
Crime
“Speaking of the neighborhood where 
you live and thinking of the possibility 
of being assaulted or robbed, do you 
feel very safe, somewhat safe, some-
what unsafe or very unsafe?”
Originally 1-Very Safe, 4-Very Unsafe. 
Converted to 100 point index, 0-Low-
est, 100 Highest.
57,942 43.52 29.95 0 100
Government 
Efforts to 
Fight Crime
“To what extent would you say the 
current administration combats (fights) 
government corruption?”
Originally 1-Not at All, 7-A Lot. Con-
verted to 100 point index, 0-Lowest, 
100 Highest.
56,382 42.42 30.30 0 100
Sociotropic 
Economic  
Situation
“Do you think that the country’s cur-
rent economic situation is better than, 
the same as or worse than it was 12 
months ago?”
0-Worse, 50-Same, 100-Better.
57,452 38.14 36.00 0 100
Pocketbook 
Economic  
Situation
“Do you think that your economic sit-
uation is better than, the same as, or 
worse than it was 12 months ago?”
0-Worse, 50-Same, 100-Better.
57,809 45.33 35.04 0 100
Skin Color
“[When the interview is complete, 
WITHOUT asking, please use the color 
chart and circle the number that most 
closely corresponds to the color of the 
face of the respondent]”
1-Lightest, 11-Darkest
58,072 4.49 1.69 1 11
Female Sex of individual. 1 if male, 2 if female. 58,230 1.51 0.50 1 2
Age
Age of individual.
Theoretically can be anywhere be-
tween 0 into the 100s. 
57,958 40.33 16.10 16 99
Wealth  
Quintile
A weighted index that measures 
wealth based on the possession of 
certain household goods such as tele-
visions, refrigerators, convention-
al and cellular telephones, vehicles, 
washing machines, microwave ovens, 
indoor plumbing, indoor bathrooms 
and computers.
1-Lowest, 5-Highest
57,681 2.95 1.42 1 5
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Education
“How many years of schooling have 
you completed?”
0-Lowest, 18+- Highest.
57,933 9.31 4.52 0 18
Urban 1 if interview took place in urban setting; 2 if rural. 58,231 1.29 0.45 1 2
Size of Place
1 if National Capital (Metropolitan Ar-
ea; 2 if Large City; 3 if Medium City; 4 
if Small City; 5 if Rural Area
58,231 3.07 1.51 1 5
2014 Control for the year 2014. - - - - -
Accessed  
Public Health 
Services
“Have you used any public health ser-
vices in the last twelve months?”
0-No, 100-Yes.
31,445 7.43 26.22 0 100
Presidential 
Approval Same as Above Dependent Variable. - - - - -
Ideology
Ideology placement that goes from 
1-10 with 1 being most liberal and 10 
most conservative.
47,858 5.49 2.68 1 10
Community 
Participation
A weighted index of community par-
ticipation in religious associations, 
parents’ associations at schools, and 
community organizations.
0-Lowest, 100-Highest. 
58,207 27.37 23.30 0 100
GINI GINI coefficient for each country year. 58,231 0.48 0.04 0.41 0.57
Economic 
Growth
Economic growth for each country 
year. 58,231 3.74 2.44 -4.0 10.2
Unemploy-
ment
Unemployment rate for each country 
year. 58,231 6.17 2.84 2.3 14.7
In spite of this compelling initial evidence that grievances 
surrounding public service provision are associated with 
swelling rates of contention, the possibility remains that 
this relationship is spurious for two reasons: 1) participation 
in protests actually increases awareness about public servi-
ce provision, and thus fuels lower evaluations, and 2) eva-
luations of public service provision are shaped by evalua-
tions of political actors and thus are not truly objective. To 
account for these limitations in our first two models, we use 
an instrumental approach that endeavors to extract what is 
exogenous from public service evaluations and determine if 
it indeed shapes protest participation.
The logic of instrumental variables regression goes as 
follows: when one suspects a key independent variable is 
endogenously related to the dependent variable of interest, 
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it must identify an instrument that satisfies two conditions. 
First, the instrument must be correlated with the endoge-
nous regressor –in this case, public service evaluations. Se-
cond, the instrument must be uncorrelated with the error 
term –in other words, it satisfies the exclusion restriction 
(Dunning, 2012). In our case, the exclusion restriction re-
quires that the instrument only affects protest participation 
through perceptions of public service quality. The instru-
ment we have chosen comes from a survey item included 
in the 2014 AmericasBarometer designed to measure state 
capacity (Luna and Soifer, 2015). It asks how long it would 
take for the police to arrive at your house if you called them 
(Lapop, 2014). Unsurprisingly, this variable is highly related 
to perceptions of public service quality (r = -0.21***), and 
wholly unrelated to protest participation (r = -0.01). 
Table A2.  
Public Service Evaluations and Protest in Latin America -  
IV Regression 
Variables (1)
Second stage (DV = Protest Participation)
Public Service Index -0.086**
(0.043)
Female -1.613***
(0.334)
Age -0.065***
(0.010)
Wealth (quintile) 0.848***
(0.120)
Skin Color 0.410***
(0.104)
Constant 13.201***
(2.353)
First stage (DV = Public Service Index)
Police Response Time -2.694***
(0.077)
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Female 0.378*
(0.222)
Age 0.042***
(0.007)
Wealth (quintile) -0.436***
(0.080)
Skin Color 0.250***
(0.070)
Constant 57.192***
(0.690)
Observations 27,190
R-squared 0.007
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A2 reports results from an instrumental variables re-
gression model (2SLS). The first stage models perceptions 
of public service provision includes our measure for state 
capacity, while the second stage models participation in a 
protest. Given the nature of the exclusion, we only include 
other covariates that are completely exogenous to pro-
test participation –i.e., age, gender, wealth, and skin col-
or (Sovey and Green, 2011). The results indicate that after 
purging our results of the potential bias associated with an 
endogenous regressor, the results presented about hold. 
This suggests that the causal arrow flows primarily from 
public service evaluations to protest rather than the oth-
er way around. It also rules out the possibility that public 
service evaluations are actually proxies for presidential ap-
proval as we argue that our state capacity measure is large-
ly independent from political affiliations. 
REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA / NÚMERO 8 (1), 2019 205
Table A3.  
Public Service Evaluations and Presidential Approval in Brazil - 
Separate 2012 and 2014 Models
DV: Presidential  
Approval in 2012
(0-100)
DV: Presidential  
Approval in 2014
(0-100)
Variables (1) (2)
Public Service Evaluations 0.138*** 0.075
(0.037) (0.050)
Interest in Politics 0.094*** -0.110**
(0.036) (0.047)
Public Service Evaluations x  
Interest in Politics -0.001 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Corruption Victim -0.039** -0.016
(0.016) (0.018)
Crime Victim -0.006 -0.009
(0.012) (0.014)
Perception of Crime -0.020 -0.010
(0.017) (0.019)
Government Efforts to Fight Crime 0.141*** 0.197***
(0.017) (0.022)
Sociotropic Economic Situation 0.092*** 0.116***
(0.017) (0.017)
Pocketbook Economic Situation 0.036** 0.068***
(0.015) (0.018)
Skin Color -0.118 0.046
(0.214) (0.305)
Female 1.037 2.878**
(0.999) (1.215)
Age 0.064* -0.019
(0.039) (0.042)
Wealth Quintile -0.740* -1.845***
(0.389) (0.496)
Education 0.128 -0.528***
(0.161) (0.190)
Urban 2.817 3.060
(1.896) (2.483)
Size 0.003 0.179
(0.429) (0.810)
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Constant 60.441*** 64.464***
(4.545) (5.650)
Observations 1,409 1,438
R-squared 0.138 0.237
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A4.  
Public Service Evaluations and Protest in Latin America
DV: Participated 
in a Protest 
(0 or 1)
Variables (1)
Health -0.002**
(0.001)
Roads -0.001
(0.001)
Schools -0.002**
(0.001)
Corruption Victim 0.005***
(0.000)
Crime Victim 0.005***
(0.000)
Government Efforts to Fight Crime -0.000
(0.001)
Perception of Crime 0.000
(0.001)
Sociotropic Economic Situation 0.0002
(0.0005)
Pocketbook Economic Situation -0.0005
(0.0005)
Skin Color 0.030***
(0.011)
Female -0.298***
(0.035)
Age -0.005***
(0.001)
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Wealth Quintile 0.012
(0.014)
Education 0.051***
(0.005)
Community Participation 0.014***
(0.001)
Urban 0.017
(0.064)
Size of Place -0.027
(0.019)
GINI 3.653
(7.929)
Economic Growth -0.045**
(0.023)
Unemployment -0.131
(0.101)
Constant -4.619
(3.915)
Observations 48,420
Number of Country Years 36
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
